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Abstract 
The current emphasis on innovation in the DoD and the imperative to maintain our 
technology edge in DoD weapons and vehicle systems requires that all avenues to meet this 
objective be reviewed. In this paper, we look in the DoD research labs and, specifically, the 
Tank Automotive Research, Development Engineering Center (TARDEC), to understand the 
challenges and successes of integrating and transitioning promising technologies into fielded 
programs. The paper examines several core activities and TARDEC’s role in bringing new 
technologies into programs. The paper describes the successes and challenges of 
technology integration and transition, and abstracts the systemic issues in the process. The 
objective is to identify process changes to address these issues, thus providing another path 
to maintaining, and in some cases, establishing the DoD advantage in various performance 
aspects of weapon and vehicle systems. 
Introduction 
The DoD and the Army are focused on technology innovation, especially with respect 
to weapons systems, to maintain the overwhelming superiority we have achieved over the 
past 75 years. There is concern that our technology superiority is decreasing and that new 
cyber and other threats are emerging, thus driving the urgency to maintain superiority in 
systems with a focus on driving innovative technology into programs. Innovative solutions 
might originate from basic research conducted at universities, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Army laboratories. These are then refined and 
further developed in the Research and Development Engineering Centers (RDECs). The 
developments from the RDECs are transitioned to programs via requirements and 
prototypes to program offices, which are then reflected in solicitations to OEMs and prime 
contractors to be realized in programs. 
This topic has been studied over the years, and many best practices have emerged 
and are in use across the systems and technology enterprise. In this paper, we are focused 
on the Tank Automotive Research, Development Engineering Center (TARDEC) and have 
used TARDEC and RDEC interchangeably. TARDEC supports the PEO Ground Combat 
Systems (GCS) and PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS&CSS) and is 
focused on combat and tactical vehicles and systems. In this paper, we have studied and 
are reporting on experiences of personnel from TARDEC and program offices to understand 
best practices that have been used and challenges encountered in innovation and 
transitioning technology to programs.  
Methodology 
The approach included a questionnaire that covered several topics:  
 Current state of technologies developed in labs 
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 Technology development in universities and other organizations 
 Changes required to drive technology from labs to programs 
 Program success in technology transition 
 Participation in technology transfer programs 
 Management practices in technology integration 
 Aids and barriers to successful integration 
 Integration issues 
 OEM/Contractor dependencies 
 Communication and organizational alignments 
 Crossing the chasm from technology development to programs 
The interviewees included senior-level leaders or directors, chief engineers from 
PEO offices, mid-level systems engineers, and integration engineers with significant 
experience in RDEC and program offices. Traditional studies have focused on measuring 
results by, for example, the number of programs transitioned. In this study, we attempted to 
capture from the practitioners what has worked and issues they have encountered to get an 
unfiltered view of technology innovation and technology transitions. 
This is a very broad field, and we have tried get an in-depth view of a small portion of 
the enterprise. As such, we make no attempt to broadly generalize these results to other 
RDECs even in the Army because programs and underlying technologies can vary 
significantly across PEOs and RDECs. However, some of the communication, planning, and 
alignment aspects discussed in this study should be applicable to other organizations as 
well. 
Discussion of Interview Results 
Current State of Technologies Being Developed in Labs  
To establish a baseline on the usefulness and utility of technologies being developed 
in the labs, we attempted to understand the interview subjects’ views on the value of these 
technologies with specific examples.  
The consensus view was that significant technology is being developed in the labs 
and that many specific technologies are tied to programs of record (POR). Examples include 
lithium ion batteries in the form factor required by army vehicles, light weight track, transport 
armor on JLTV, combat transmission systems, advanced combat engines, active 
development of a combat vehicle prototype, lightweight armor, integrated modular occupant 
protection, manufacturing techniques for welding improvements, and composite armor. 
One view is that labs and TARDEC in particular are very good at niche technologies 
such as armor, but that they place less emphasis on the development and integration of 
emerging technologies such as mobility solutions in the commercial industry automotive 
industry. That said, recent initiatives suggest that technologies from the automotive industry 
are being explored for prototype development.  
Innovation and Development in Universities and Other Organizations  
We next compared innovation and development in the labs with innovation and 
development in other organizations such as universities, non-governmental labs, and 
defense contractors.  
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Some views stated that basic research and some level of applied research originated 
from universities but development and effort was required to transition this research to 
RDECs. Others noted that universities supported science and technology in other ways, for 
example, by providing tools for systems engineering. An example of a tool is the Vehicle 
Health Management capability at Wayne State University that was supported by the 
program office. 
Visibility into IRAD spending by defense contractors is limited, so it is not clear 
whether innovation is coming from defense contractors. In addition, it appears that defense 
contractors’ spending on IRAD was focused on requirements in programs of record and not 
specifically on innovation. Therefore, unless innovation was reflected in the requirements, it 
would not make it to programs of record. Some interviewees suggested following up the 
requirements development with prototypes or demonstrators by the labs to further inform the 
requirements. Another point of view suggests that, in some instances, it is difficult for 
TARDEC to take innovation risk. To accelerate innovation, then, TARDEC has had to use 
non-traditional defense partners under non-Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).  
Another factor that impedes innovation is cost, both for development and unit cost of 
production. This also leads to risk minimization both by the program office and the defense 
contractor.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from these responses is that universities, Army 
research labs, and DARPA provide basic research. Applied research, however, must come 
from RDECs, which must also oversee early phases of the acquisition cycle, while program 
offices manage engineering and development in the later phases of the acquisition cycle via 
defense contractors. In this way, RDECs would provide the valuable input to programs with 
well-informed requirements derived from advanced development and prototypes. Program 
offices would then be better positioned to solicit solutions from contractors.  
Changes Required to Drive Technology Developed Into Programs  
A recommended strategy to drive technology from the RDECs to programs is by 
getting the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to drive requirements to both 
the RDECs and program offices. This would allow the development of technology and 
prototypes in the RDECs, and, because program offices would be working to the same 
requirements, the transition from the RDECs to programs would be easier. A second 
potential feature of the above approach would be to get results from RDEC efforts to feed 
requirements in RFPs. 
There are other systemic issues however. First, PMs are focused on incremental 
changes to programs managing risk and cost and shorter term EMD goals, while the RDECs 
are focused on technology goals and revolutionary changes, and the Army is focused on 
strategic initiatives. These viewpoints need to be aligned to enable an efficient approach to 
innovation. Second, funding requests need to be aligned. Currently, PMs’ Program 
Objectives Memoranda include funding requests for what they know now and not for what 
may be coming down the pike. However, on occasion, PMs also require technology 
upgrades or better “gizmos” to address threat and priority changes and need a quick 
turnaround; while the RDECs are willing to respond, the technology maturation can be a 
lengthy process. This is especially true of technology changes to the underlying vehicle 
platform.  
So with little coordination and no targeted funding, transitioning from the RDECs to 
programs presents serious challenges. 
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Program Success in Technology Transition 
This topic revealed several views on transitioning technology. One view is that there 
is no discernible trend in the rate of successful integration. This then leads to a question 
about the availability of metrics that measure successful integration, the lack of which makes 
it difficult to understand the roadmap to successful integration. Another view is that 
integration success has been opportunity-driven, especially over the last two years, 
exemplified by the Armored Fighting Vehicle, which has seen several integration efforts that 
have informed the requirements process. A different approach to measuring the success of 
integration must start with the definition of success. For example, with respect to armor 
capability, the integration efforts in TARDEC informed the requirements for final design, 
which led to an improved vehicle. Thus RDEC provided a feasible solution, which drove to a 
better product even though the specific work effort may not have transitioned.  
The strategy of modernizing rather than initiating new development programs led to 
modernizing at the lower level subsystems rather than the system level. The focus on the 
subsystems has led to successful integration efforts; however, when contingency 
requirements drive modernization, the enhancements are fielded, but sustainment efforts 
are challenged due to lack of program ownership. This lack of program ownership also limits 
additional quantity buys and further improvements. Finally, there is the view that integration 
efforts are hampered by the level of oversight at various leadership levels and contribute to 
lower success rates in technology integration. 
The summary of the above discussion leads to several conclusions: 
 Successful integration needs to be defined to include informing requirements 
in addition to transitioning specific development into programs.  
 Appropriate metrics to capture all the value of RDEC efforts need to be 
defined and captured.  
 Integration and transitions must have a program owner identified even for 
efforts driven by contingency requirements.  
Aids and Barriers to Successful Integration  
Successful integration has been driven by demand from the acquisition or PM 
functions for risk-reduction efforts or capability improvements. Several examples of 
successful integration include armor protection, Victory architecture, throttle control 
software, and lightweight track among many others. In addition, contingency requirements, 
urgent fielding requests, and a focus on controlling sustainment costs also drive integration. 
Natural conflicts exist between RDEC leadership and PEO/PMs, as they operate in different 
environments with different objectives, but strong personal relationships can overcome 
these conflicts and lead to successful integrations. 
Challenges to successful integration include an understanding of the technology 
development effort as either being exploratory in nature, which would require close 
cooperation between the RDEC and program office to mature and succeed, versus a 
specific deliverable that can be driven by a transition agreement. Transition agreements 
ensure that the RDEC capability meets schedule and functional requirements and that the 
program is ready to accept the deliverable. Another challenge to integration, expressed by 
one interviewee, was that PMs focus on thresholds and “do not lose sleep on objectives,” 
while TARDEC focuses on objectives. With limited interaction between PM engineers and 
TARDEC, technology is not incorporated into programs. If PMs can focus on objectives and 
drive the process, TARDEC can help reduce the risk in programs; so, while a specific 
technology integration may not be the final result, informed requirements and risk mitigation 
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might be the benefits that need to be recorded. Finally, several interviewees articulated that 
limited funding was a common challenge and a significant barrier to integration.  
To summarize, lack of funding can be a significant barrier to integration and 
transitioning of RDEC efforts to the programs. PM demand for improvements, risk mitigation, 
and contingency requirements are the primary drivers for successful integration. In all cases, 
a thorough understanding of the specific technology development and integration effort 
versus conceptual deliverables must be defined and agreed to between the RDEC and the 
program office.  
Participation in Technology Transfer Programs  
Several technology development and transfer programs have been in existence 
along with various funding avenues. The following are some of the programs:  
 Joint Concept Technology Demonstration 
 Foreign Comparative Testing 
 Quick Reaction Fund 
 Rapid Reaction Fund 
 Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology 
Transfer(STTR) 
 Agile Integration and Development 
 Collaborative Technology Alliances 
 Technology Transfer Initiatives 
 Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) and Army Technical 
Objective (ATO) 
All of the above programs have been used on different technology development 
efforts; SBIR and STTR have been used extensively. The JCTD was used for the Trailer 
program; Foreign Comparative Testing was used on the Howitzer program; and Agile 
Integration and Development was used on the lightweight track development. Several 
Technology Transfer Initiatives have been used at TARDEC.  
These initiatives are a necessary condition for technology innovation and transition to 
be successful, and their widespread use must be viewed as an advantage for TARDEC and 
the PMOs.  
Management Practices in Technology Integration  
Management practices also bear on the possibility of technology transition. The 
following are some of the common practices: 
 Roadmap reviews of technology plans between organizations 
 Technology requirements and alignment with program requirements 
 Formal collaboration between TARDEC and Program Offices 
 Technology Transfer Agreements or equivalent 
 Metrics to measure success of technology integration  
We determined that several of these practices are in use, including requiring twice-a-
year requirements reviews, a 30-year plan review, strategic engagement at the leadership 
level, and soliciting long-range input from TRADOC. Systems agreements are another 
mechanism to align TARDEC and PMO offices. One caution was sounded on TTA 
(Technology Transition Agreements), which are binding on the RDEC to deliver and on the 
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PM to implement except when PMs are not sure of the risks and challenges of integration. 
TTAs can be signed without guarantees, which can impact future transition efforts. 
These practices are necessary conditions for successful transitions but need a 
greater emphasis on the alignment to ensure PMOs and RDECs are working towards the 
same program goals. In some instances, these efforts will focus on emerging requirements 
and may not result in capabilities that can be transferred to programs. In other instances, 
specific technologies are ready to be integrated into programs of record. The key factor in 
successful transitions is the agreement and alignment between the RDEC and the program 
offices. 
Integration Issues 
A discussion on integration issues identified that a propensity for low risk drives both 
RDEC and PMOs. PMs focus on low technical risk to ensure programs can meet objectives, 
while the S&T manages to a TRL 6, resulting in few game changers and fewer revolutionary 
improvements. In some instances, a 5% improvement in combat vehicles can take up to 10 
years. A second issue that arises in integration is the lack of clarity around the integrator’s 
role and who plays this role. Informal requirements communicated to the RDECs can lead to 
technology demonstrators, but the work effort to convert these technology demonstrators to 
a capability with specific platform-integration goals is a gap that needs to be filled to facilitate 
successful transitions. The lack of alignment of RDEC strategic priorities with PM 
requirements results in funding issues to integrate and transition technology from the RDEC 
to programs. The lack of coordination results in some efforts getting funded and in other 
instances the PM turning to the OEM or prime contractor to meet the requirement. 
OEM/Contractor Dependencies  
Innovations from RDECs go through multiple development efforts and eventually 
require integration by OEMs or prime contractors. The TARDEC prototype integration facility 
and systems integration lab have led to clearer requirements and informed the integration 
efforts by the prime contractors. The efforts on the Active Protection System and double V 
hull based on an open systems architecture resulting in transition specification are examples 
of TARDEC development efforts that have or will result in a handoff to the contractor or 
OEM for integration into a vehicle platform for production. Integration into vehicle platforms 
will require knowledge and expertise in manufacturing and high-volume production. The 
OEM or prime contractor is the appropriate resource. This discussion highlights the 
interdependencies between the program office and the RDEC in ensuring that funding is 
available for the RDECs to develop the technology and prototypes for integration. 
Solicitations can then reflect the design requirements that emerged from the RDEC efforts, 
and funding can be programmed for development and production to include these transition 
efforts.  
The consensus opinion of the interviewees was that 90% of the transition efforts in 
the RDECs will require integration by the prime contractors and the OEMs, and funding and 
resources must therefore be planned.  
Communications and Organizational Alignments  
Organizational changes such as reorganizing TARDEC research groups to focus on 
programs and the appointment of CIEs (Chief Integration Engineer) have supported 
technology transition efforts. Formal communications between PMO and TARDEC are also 
critical for continued integration success. The Active Protection System is an example of 
how significant input from the PMO has influenced the project’s development in TARDEC. 
Senior leadership summits, review of 30-year planning documents, subject-matter-expert 
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communications, and formal exchanges supplemented by personal relationships reinforce 
the importance of communication in supporting technology transitions.  
Crossing the Chasm 
In this section, we cover the changes that are required to successfully cross from the 
RDECs to programs. Greater interaction between subject matter experts in the labs and 
program offices on an ongoing basis, including participation in preliminary and critical design 
reviews should benefit the technology transition process. The use of TRADOC to drive 
requirements to both the RDECs and PMOs with a short, medium, and long-term horizon 
should assist in directing RDEC efforts appropriately, and when coordinated with PMOs, 
should support the development of a strategic and tactical plan. 
There is a recognition that mobility initiatives in the commercial automotive and 
transportation industries are driving innovation that should be explored for use in programs 
and by TARDEC. TARDEC is using an innovative business approach to allow a consortium 
consisting of small technology companies, larger defense companies, and automotive 
companies to develop prototypes based on technologies emerging in the auto industries, 
such as autonomous vehicles. These prototypes can then inform requirements, capabilities, 
and designs for future solicitations. Similar consortiums are also being used to explore other 
technology prototypes in areas such as sensors and robotics that have more immediate 
applicability to ground vehicles, both combat and tactical. These consortia respond to 
requests for technology prototypes under Other Transaction Authority (OTA) provided by 
Congress to the DoD specifically to attract nontraditional defense and technology 
companies. The OTA provides more flexibility in dealing with smaller companies in the areas 
of intellectual property rights and speed to market when compared to contracting under the 
FAR regulations. 
Funding program transitions explicitly is a key driver of ensuring transfer of RDEC 
efforts to programs. Leadership plays a key role in the realization of successful integration 
efforts by supporting the successes and challenges of technology transitions and stressing 
the importance of these efforts. 
Current Literature on Technology Transitions  
A limited survey of literature on technology transitions suggests similar views to 
those discussed in this paper. In The Future of Army Science and Technology Requires 
Punctuated Equilibrium, Col. John R. Cavedo (n.d.) describes a broad strategy for 
reorganizing and managing Army Science and Technology with a new business model. One 
of the key recommendations from this paper is that S&T should “focus less on technology 
transition and more on proving the value of technology through prototyping and 
requirements validation. This will require additional 6.4 funding.” The paper also refers to the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Research and Technology (DASA RT) goal of “Align S&T and 
develop strategies which provide technology insertion points to Programs of Record.” The 
paper posits that “by focusing too much on technology transition there is a high probability 
that S&T managers will avoid risk and won’t push the boundaries of technology 
advancement,” and that “transitioning an S&T effort to a program of record is fraught with 
blind spots.”  
DASA policy on Transition Agreements (TA) for Army Science and Technology 
Projects requires TAs be developed for all Advanced Technology Development (6.3), 
Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (6.4), and Manufacturing Technology 
(6.7) executed projects. The TA captures RDEC responsibilities and deliverables, PEO or 
Recipient responsibilities and mutual responsibilities. This template provides the basis for an 
organized formal process for transition agreements that should lead to success.  
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In “Bridging the Valley of Death,” Anthony Davis, Director of Agile Acquisition for U.S. 
Special Operations Command, and Tom Ballenger, aviation systems analyst with JHNA Inc., 
have outlined a Transition Confidence Level Scale from 1 to 9 similar to the Technology 
Readiness Level model to track the steps for transition from uncertainty to a completed 
transition (Davis & Ballenger, 2017). “Like the TRL chart, the steps enable status scoring for 
a project, and form a roadmap for progress and coordination typically needed for transition 
success.” This promising approach enables a data-driven standardized approach to 
measuring the progress of technology transitions. Similar models have been recommended 
in the RDECs, and these models allow for agreements with program offices on metrics to 
support the transition, and these can also be added to the TA template from DASA RT. 
This study and the above literature have focused on the Army S&T enterprise, but 
future studies should review the best practices in the Air Force and Navy for possible use by 
Army RDECs. 
Conclusions 
 Universities, laboratories, DARPA, and defense contractors play a role in 
technology innovation, but primarily RDECs support the realization of the 
innovation and its transfer to programs. 
 OEM contractors perform best when requirements are informed by advanced 
development and prototypes from RDECs developed internally or through 
non-traditional technology development organizations. There exists a 
significant interdependency between the RDECs and OEM contractors, with 
PMO offices interfacing with both; 90% of integration efforts will require OEM 
contractor participation.  
 RDECs need to extend their reach by partnering with non-traditional 
companies to drive technologies and capabilities from smaller companies or 
large non-defense contractors into programs. 
 Integrated efforts by TRADOC, RDECs and program offices to coordinate a 
view of the future both in the short term and medium term would benefit 
innovation and transition efforts.  
 POM funding requests should be aligned so that they include not only the 
short- to medium-term requests but also include funding to translate 
innovation into prototypes and transitioning into programs. 
 RDEC value is realized via many different avenues: transitioning technology 
prototypes to programs, informing requirements to improve solicitations, and 
engineering or manufacturing process improvements. Appropriate metrics to 
measure this value must developed. Transition Confidence Levels or other 
similar measures are a valuable tool to assess transition efforts and direct 
resources. 
 Lack of funding is an obvious roadblock to technology innovation and 
transition, while risk-mitigation-based demands from program offices, 
contingency requirements, and threat changes seem to be significant drivers 
of innovation. 
 Technology Transfer programs like SBIR, STTR, JCTD, TECD, and ATO are 
a necessary condition to foster innovation. 
 OTA can be used to engage non-traditional companies to access the latest 
technology from smaller companies and the commercial marketplace.  
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 Integration and transitions must have program owners in both the RDEC and 
program offices who are aligned and in agreement to deliver successful 
transitions. 
 Communications at the strategic level, communication of long range plans, 
senior leadership summits, and exchanges between subject matter experts 
are all important activities to support effective transitions.  
Crossing the chasm from technology innovation and development to programs 
successfully requires many organizations and activities to come together. The conclusions 
above reflect many practices that are currently in place. The challenge, however, is to align 
the practices and operate them as part of a system for effective transition of innovations. 
Figure 1 depicts an operational view of a process for technology transfers  
 
 Technology Innovation and Transition: A System View 
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